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We Need a Fracking Baseline
INTRODUCTION
In more than 3,000 locations across Louisiana,1 a pressurized concoction
of water and select toxic and nontoxic chemicals has been, or will be, injected
into the earth at up to 100 barrels per minute, with a pressure as high as 15,000
pounds per square inch (“psi”).2 A mere 10 psi of pressure applied on the
human body is equivalent to 294 mile-per-hour winds, exerting a force
sufficient to demolish reinforced concrete buildings.3 The Plutonium bomb
detonated over Nagasaki created pressures nearing 15 psi at 0.5 miles from
ground zero and caused total destruction within the radius.4 Pressures nearly
1,000 times greater than that blast pressure are required to crack rock
formations lying deep beneath Louisiana’s farms, communities, and cities.5
Hydraulic fracturing, more commonly referred to as “fracking,” is a
polarizing subject in politics,6 the environmental debate,7 and the media.8
Copyright 2016, by RYAN KING.
1. Abraham Lustgarten & Krista Kjellerman Schmidt, State-by-State:
Underground Injection Wells, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 20, 2012 12:00 PM), http://pro
jects.propublica.org/graphics/underground-injection-wells [https://perma.cc/M2DPFEX4] (select the state of Louisiana).
2. See A Look at the Hydraulic Fracturing Process and How it Works, STI
GROUP, http://setxind.com/upstream/the-hydraulic-fracking-process-and-how-itworks [https://perma.cc/5CA8-3XWA] (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
3. R. KARL ZIPF, JR. & KENNETH L. CASHDOLLAR, NAT’L INST. FOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, EFFECTS OF BLAST PRESSURE ON
STRUCTURES AND THE HUMAN BODY, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive
/pdfs/NIOSH-125/125-ExplosionsandRefugeChambers.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV
R7-MSHP].
4. Frank von Hippel, The Myths of Edward Teller, BULL. ATOMIC SCI., Mar.
1983, at 6, 10.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. President Barack Obama, Remarks on America’s Energy Security at
Georgetown University (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/03/30/remarks-president-americas-energy-security [https://perma.cc/J7A
N-Q4U5] (“Recent innovations have given us the opportunity to tap large reserves—
perhaps a century’s worth of reserves, a hundred years [sic] worth of reserves—in the
shale under our feet. But just as is true in terms of us extracting oil from the ground,
we’ve got to make sure that we’re extracting natural gas safely, without polluting our
water supply.”).
7. GASLAND (HBO Documentary Films 2010).
8. Late Show with David Letterman (CBS television broadcast July 18,
2012) (host claiming that a number of states have been ruined by the “greedy oil
and gas companies of this country” and the practice of fracking).
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Although experimental fracking was first used in 1947,9 its use expanded
significantly during the shale boom of the 2000s.10 Hydraulic fracturing
involves pumping numerous chemicals diluted by water, including some that
are toxic,11 into the ground at a pressure high enough to crack deep rock
formations and increase oil and gas production. The use of fracturing has
grown exponentially over the past decade;12 accordingly, the number of
lawsuits claiming contamination by hydraulic fracturing has increased.13
Often, landowners can prove that oil and gas production chemicals have
contaminated their water source; given the evidentiary requirements,
however, they are routinely unable to prove that the fracturing operations
on the land caused the contamination.14 These landowners are required to
demonstrate a causal link between the source of the contaminant and the
9. Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History
of an Enduring Technology, J. PETROLEUM TECH., Dec. 2010, at 26, 27 (noting that
the first successful commercial fracturing treatment was not performed until 1949).
10. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-038320, ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2015, at 20 (2015) (“[T]otal dry natural gas production in the United
States increased by 35% from 2005 to 2013 . . . .”).
11. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-15/047a, ASSESSMENT OF THE
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS ON
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES [Draft] 5-72 (2015). As indicated, this report is a
draft, and expert commentary during the comment period may alter the contents
of the original.
12. AM. PETROLEUM INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: UNLOCKING AMERICA’S
NATURAL GAS RESOURCES 1 (2014), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy
/Exploration/HYDRAULIC_FRACTURING_PRIMER.ashx [https://perma.cc/AU2
A-ZJEJ] (before the shale boom, natural gas production from shale constituted
roughly 2% of the United States output; by the end of 2015 it will reach 37%, and by
2035 it is projected to reach 75%); see also MOHSEN BONAKDARPOUR ET AL., IHS
GLOBAL INSIGHT, INC., THE ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTIONS OF
SHALE GAS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2011), http://anga.us/media/con
tent/F7D1750E-9C1E-E786-674372E5D5E98A40/files/shale-gas-economic-impactdec-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXC4-4F6C].
13. See BARCLAY NICHOLSON, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT ANALYSIS OF
LITIGATION INVOLVING SHALE & HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1 (2014),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/20140101-analysis-of-litigation-involvingshale-hydraulic-fracturing-104256.pdf [https://perma.cc/959K-7XKG]; see also
Blake Watson, Hydraulic Fracturing Tort Litigation Summary, UNIV. OF DAYTON
SCH. OF L., http://www.udayton.edu/directory/law/documents/watson/blake_watson
_hydraulic_fracturing_primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K5R-4CG9] (last updated July
23, 2016) (noting that the majority of the 99 contamination cases listed were filed
within the past five years).
14. See Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 518 (M.D. Pa. 2014);
Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578, 586–87 (5th Cir. 2002).

2016]

COMMENT

547

actual contamination.15 Unfortunately, both are usually thousands of feet
or miles beneath the earth’s surface, rendering the procurement of this
evidence impossible.16 Furthermore, years may pass before the
contamination actually occurs.17 Consequently, obtaining equitable relief in
cases in which contamination has already been proven is highly improbable,
if not impossible.18
Hydraulic fracturing has not been proven to be inherently dangerous;
this factor should be considered prior to the implementation of any new
regulations, as the utility of the practice exceeds its proven risk.19 However,
until the impact on finite groundwater resources is conclusively determined,
the acquisition of information and evidence should be improved to develop
a full record on the subject matter, while simultaneously promoting the
industry and protecting landowners. The federal government remains
detached from the issue, as Congress has permitted exemptions for the
practice in both of the major pieces of legislation intended to regulate the
industry and protect the nations water, the Clean Water Act and the Safe
Drinking Water Act.20 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
conducted a five-year study that resulted in inconclusive outcomes, partially
because of the lack of a requirement for operators to perform baseline
testing.21
Due to the lack of federal guidance and sufficient data acquisition,
Louisiana must take steps to protect its landowners, drinking water
resources, and the industries essential to its economy. The first step should
be requiring hydraulic fracturing operators to perform baseline water testing
prior to any hydraulic injections. This data will aid injured plaintiffs in
their pursuit for a factual link to contamination. It will aid the industry by
possibly providing evidence that fracturing is not the cause of
contamination. Finally, it will aid the state’s economy by promoting best
practices and easing public concern. Additionally, once a comprehensive
15. See Anthony, 284 F.3d 578.
16. AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 12, at 7.
17. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-56–6-57.
18. See infra Part II.A.1.
19. See infra Part I.C. But see infra Part I.B; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
supra note 11, at 10–20 (finding that contamination has occurred through multiple
avenues in a relatively small number of cases, but noting that the number of cases
might be understated because of insufficient pre- and post-fracturing data of the
groundwater resources).
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-22 (noting that one of
the limitations of the reported data was the lack of pre-fracturing local water
quality data).
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data set is established, the industry and regulatory agencies will be better
able to determine when and where contamination is or is not occurring.
Agencies can then implement or remove regulations to make the process
safer and more efficient.
This Comment does not argue that hydraulic fracturing is inherently
dangerous, nor that its use should be restricted, but instead discusses several
issues that have arisen from the practice, including the potential for
increased risk as the shale boom continues. It argues that Louisiana should
apply a mixed regulatory strategy beginning with requiring baseline water
testing and promoting best-practices regulations as standards develop or
when issues arise, which will protect both the industry and the landowners.
Part I explains hydraulic fracturing and contamination while also
demonstrating that hydraulic fracturing is essential to Louisiana and the
United States. Part II discusses the theories of liability available to injured
landowners and the evidentiary requirements’ prevention of an equitable
resolution, regardless of whether strict liability is imposed. Part III illustrates
Congress’s refusal to regulate the industry and demonstrates several states’
compensation for this lack of regulation, whereby states enact their own
regulations. Part IV examines the issues from the perspectives of the
landowner, the operator, and the State to develop a solution beneficial to all.
This Comment concludes by proposing that Louisiana should require
baseline water testing before hydraulic fracturing operations and use the data
collected over time to establish best-practices regulations for the industry.
I. THE NECESSITY OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
Hydraulic fracturing has transformed the Louisiana22 and national
economies over the past decade.23 Since its inception, the industry has also
improved its own procedures to attain higher production at a lower risk.24
Although the practice is the subject of much controversy and debate, the
benefits of cheap energy are indisputable.25 Over the next decade, Louisiana
expects nearly $100 billion in investments from an industrial renaissance
largely attributed to low natural gas prices,26 and the nation as a whole
22. See infra Part I.C.1.
23. See infra Part I.C.1.
24. In the 1950s, hydraulic fracturing became prevalent over the more
hazardous nitroglycerin fracturing. The first fracturing fluids were petroleumbased until the industry moved to the water-based gel fluids in the 1970s.
Montgomery & Smith, supra note 9, at 27–28.
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. LOREN C. SCOTT & JAMES A. RICHARDSON, THE LOUISIANA ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: 2015 AND 2016, at iii (2014) (In 2014, “Louisiana [was] in the midst
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stands to gain if the production of shale energy sources27 remains safe and
efficient.
A. Understanding Hydraulic Fracturing and its Development
Hydraulic fracturing is a method for stimulating underground rock
formations to increase oil and gas production.28 It is commonly used in
conjunction with horizontal drilling to maximize formation stimulation
and overall production of oil and gas.29 The wellbore can penetrate the
earth a mile or more vertically before gradually turning horizontal and
continuing for up to an additional 6,000 feet.30 Once the desired terminal
location is reached and the well is prepared, fracking fluid, called “mud,”
is injected into the well at a pressure that exceeds the breakdown pressure
of the formation.31 The high-pressure fluid causes the formation to crack,
creating a fracture that generally runs vertically in both directions through
the formation.32 The operator pumps the fluid into the fracture, expanding
the crack until it is wide enough to accept the chosen propping agent, or
“proppant.”33 Operators then add propping agents such as sand or ceramic
beads34 to the fluid after the fracture is formed to fill the fracture, thereby
“propping open” the fracture and permitting the flow of oil or gas to the
well.35 The final step is to pump the fracking fluid back to the surface,

of an industrial boom unlike any other in our history, with over $100 billion in
industrial projects either under construction or at the front-end engineering and
design phase.”); id. at 104 (projecting Louisiana to have more than 2 million nonfarm employees for the first time in history in 2015).
27. Shale energy is natural gas and oil produced from a fine-grained sedimentary
rock known as shale. Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have made the
production of shale energy much more efficient. See Shale 101: An Overview of Shale
Energy, INST. FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY, http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default
/files/shale_101.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6DW-TVFL] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-1.
29. Id.
30. AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 12, at 7.
31. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF
IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS, at App. A-1 (2004) (fracturing
fluid may also be referred to as “pad”).
32. Id.
33. Id.; see Montgomery & Smith, supra note 9, at 28.
34. Id. at App. A-13.
35. Id.
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where it is collected; the proppant is left behind to hold the crack open.36
The amount of fracking fluid left in the well is termed “leakoff”; the
amount of leakoff depends on the formation being fractured.37 In some
formations, 90% or more of the fracturing fluid might be left in the well.38
The fracking fluid injected into the well is designed with a specific
chemical composition to serve a particular function.39 The fluids often
vary by company, location, and well.40 The primary functions of the fluid
are to create and expand the fracture, transport the proppant to the fracture,
and abandon the proppant in the fracture, thus propping the fracture
open.41 The fear of groundwater contamination is due in large part to the
chemical additives necessary to perform these tasks. On average, roughly
1.5 million gallons of water are used in the hydraulic fracturing of each
well,42 with some formations requiring up to 15 million gallons.43
Chemical additives typically constitute 2% or less of the mixture.44 The
EPA estimates the total volume of chemicals injected into each well ranges
from 2,600 gallons to 18,000 gallons.45 More information has been
introduced in recent years regarding the chemical composition of the
fracking chemicals through voluntary and mandatory disclosures.46

36. Joe Schremmer, Avoidable “Fraccident”: An Argument Against Strict
Liability for Hydraulic Fracturing, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1215, 1220 (2012).
37. The amount of fluid remaining in the well is determined by the amount
of fluid injected into the well, the reservoir’s hydraulic properties, the capillary
pressure near the fracture faces, and the length of time between the well being
shut in and production. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-35.
38. Id. Other studies have shown 85% or more fracturing fluid remaining in
some Marcellus Shale wells. Additionally, a study of 271 wells in West Virginia
revealed that more than 85% of the total volume of fracturing fluid remained in
more than 80 of the Marcellus Shale wells. Id. at 7-9.
39. For example, acids are added to dissolve cement, minerals, and clays;
biocides control or eliminate bacteria; and corrosion inhibitor protects the iron
and steel components of the well. Id. at 5-10–5-11.
40. Id. at ES-12.
41. Id. at ES-10.
42. Id.
43. Jean-Philippe Nicot & Bridget R. Scanlon, Water Use for Shale-Gas
Production in Texas, U.S., 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3580, 3582 (2012) (Haynesville
Shale averages 5.7 million gallons per well and Eagle-Ford averages 4.3 million
gallons per well).
44. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-10.
45. Id. at ES-12.
46. About Us, FRACFOCUS, http://www.fracfocus.org [https://perma.cc/67
4W-RG4B] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). Fracfocus is an online registry that
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However, the majority of companies refuse to disclose any proprietary or
trade-secret additives when not required by state law.47 No federal
regulation regarding the disclosure of fracturing chemicals currently
exists; consequently, the states’ requirements vary significantly.48 Some
of the variance in state requirements may be attributed to the type of
chemicals required for the state’s specific geologic conditions and which
avenue for contamination is most likely.49
The current method of hydraulic fracturing traces its roots to the 19th
century practice of “shooting” the well.50 Originally, the fracturing
operator dropped liquid or solidified nitroglycerine into the well and
detonated it to fragment the oil-bearing formation and increase the flow of
oil to the well.51 Operators attempted different fracturing methods over the
years before a viable hydraulic fracturing commercial application was
performed in 1949.52 This original method involved pumping crude oil
mixed with gasoline and sand into the formation.53 In the first year,
operators treated 332 wells, with an average increase in well production of
75%.54 The use of hydraulic fracturing continued to increase with an
estimated 25,000 to 30,000 wells fractured annually in the U.S. between
2011 and 2014.55 Overall, an estimated two million wells have been

collects data from mandatory disclosures and allows operators to voluntarily
disclose the chemical composition of their hydraulic fracturing treatments.
47. See infra Part III.B.2.
48. Wyoming requires companies to make disclosures of the contents of the
fluid to the state, and the information is made public after any proprietary
information is redacted. Arkansas does not require the chemical composition to
be disclosed, but it does require the additives to be categorized by type. See Jeffrey
C. King, Factual Causation: The Missing Link in Hydraulic Fracture –
Groundwater Contamination Litigation, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 341,
358–59 (2012).
49. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed.
Reg. 16,183 (proposed Mar. 26, 2015) (codified at BLM Onshore Oil and Gas
Operations, 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2016)) (deciding against a national requirement for
baseline testing partially because local authorities are better informed of their
specific geologic conditions).
50. Montgomery & Smith, supra note 9, at 27.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-5.
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hydraulically fractured over the past 60 years.56 With 95% of new wells
requiring hydraulic fracturing to reach their designed production potential,57
the industry’s growth is expected to continue.58
B. Sources of Hydraulic Fracturing Contamination
Although fracturing chemicals are intended to serve a specific purpose
in the production of oil and gas, debate continues over the possibility of
the chemicals migrating into drinking water resources.59 Currently, barring
a local ordinance prohibiting the activity, the practice of hydraulic
fracturing is permitted to occur near residences60 and drinking water
resources.61 In 2013, approximately 6,800 public drinking water sources
serving more than 8.6 million Americans had at least one hydraulically
fractured well located a mile or less from the source.62 The three primary
sources of concern over drinking water contamination are due to accidents
or spills occurring at the surface, migration of the fluid from the production
zone through the formation into drinking water resources, and movement
of fluid out of the production well because of deficiencies in the well
casing.63
The first source of contamination is a surface spill, which can occur
during the shipment of materials to the fracturing site, during operations
at the drill site, or even after the fluid is collected as produced water or

56. Natural Gas from Shale: Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/how_is_shale_gas_produced.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/8SWM-BMSD] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).
57. Id.
58. See 3 IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, AMERICA’S NEW ENERGY FUTURE: THE
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS REVOLUTION AND THE US ECONOMY 47 (2013),
http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/Americas_New_Energy_Future_Phase3
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QJ4-PL8C]. The value added for the entire unconventional
energy-value chain and energy-related chemicals is expected to increase to $533
billion in 2025, from $284 billion in 2012. Id. Jobs that the shale gas industry created
are expected to increase from 600,000 in 2012 to over 1.6 million by 2035. Id. at v.
59. See GASLAND, supra note 7; Late Show, supra note 8 (host claiming that
the “greedy oil and gas companies of this country” and the practice of fracking
have ruined a number of states).
60. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-5–ES-6 (noting that
between 2000 and 2013 approximately 9.4 million Americans resided a mile or
less from a hydraulically fractured well).
61. Id. at 3-11.
62. Id.
63. Id. at ES-13–ES-14.
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flowback.64 The fluid collected at the well site is collectively referred to as
“produced water” and includes the fracturing fluid and any water extracted
from the formation.65 Wells in close proximity have shown a higher incident
rate of “well communication events” that lead to surface spills caused by wellcomponent failures.66 These well communications occur when either the
wellbore or fractures of the well being hydraulically fractured intersect the
wellbore or fractures of a nearby well, permitting the pressurized fluid of the
first well to invade the second well.67 If the second well is properly sealed and
abandoned, the invasion should not occur or cause problems.68 However,
many older wells were not designed to contain the high pressures associated
with hydraulic fracturing.69 In the EPA’s study of 225 surface spills of
produced water, the average volume of released fluid in each spill was 990
gallons, with 8% of the studied spills reaching surface or groundwater.70
The second source of contamination occurs through the migration of gas
or chemicals from the production zone through the rock formation into
groundwater.71 This migration likely occurs during either the pressurized
fracturing or through natural fluid activities over years or even decades.72
Impermeable formations and formations significantly deeper than the
groundwater are much less likely to permit this sort of migration because more
obstacles lie between the contamination source and the groundwater.73
Several formations such as the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and West
Virginia and the Haynesville Shale in Louisiana and Texas lie very deep and
might have a mile or more between the top of the formation and the base of
the groundwater.74 However, an EPA study of 23,000 wells concluded that
20% of the wells had fewer than 2,000 feet between the shallowest point of
fracturing and the base of the groundwater resource.75
The third source of contamination involves migration within the wellbore
through the casing of the wellbore being fractured or through a nearby well
experiencing well communication.76 The well casing is a steel pipe that
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at ES-17, 7-30.
Id. at ES-16.
Id.
Id. at 6-42–6-45.
Id. at 6-45.
Id. at 6-51–6-52.
Id. at ES-17, ES-19.
Id. at 6-48.
Id. at 6-56–6-57.
Id. at ES-15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ES-14.
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encircles the well, provides support, and prevents fluid migration.77 The
surface casing typically extends from the wellhead through any groundwater
zones and is commonly encircled by cement.78 Many older wells were
constructed with insufficient casing and were not designed for the highpressure injections associated with hydraulic fracturing;79 these wells are
commonly reopened and hydraulically fractured. These wells may also be
infiltrated with pressurized fracturing fluid through well communication with
nearby wells being hydraulically fractured.80 Additionally, even modern wells
that were designed for hydraulic fracturing are susceptible to design or
construction imperfections81 and prove to be a source of contamination.82
C. The Beneficial Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing
Despite the risk associated with the practice, hydraulic fracturing is a vital
element of the United States’s energy and economic portfolios. The shale
boom provides a tremendous source of economic benefit for not only the
hydraulic fracturing operators, but also for the government and the average
American household. In 2012, unconventional oil and gas operations were
estimated to contribute $1,200 in real disposable income to each household in
America.83 The conventional oil and gas value chain and energy-related
chemical sector are expected to provide 2.9 million U.S. jobs in 2015.84
Americans benefit directly from hydraulic fracturing through increased
employment opportunities and decreased energy costs, and indirectly through
manufacturers’ ability to produce chemicals and products more profitably
because of access to cheaper energy.

77. Id. at 6-4.
78. Id.
79. Id. at ES-15 (estimating that 6% of the 23,000 wells studied were drilled
ten years before being hydraulically fractured and suggesting that these wells may
not have been designed to withstand the stresses associated with hydraulic
fracturing).
80. Many wells were improperly plugged in the 1950s by using little to no
cement. Id. at ES-16.
81. Id. at ES-14 (estimating that 3% of the 23,000 wells studied between 2009
and 2010 did not have cement across a portion of the casing within groundwater
depths).
82. Id. at ES-14–ES-15 (arguing that natural gas was able to migrate into
Bainbridge, Ohio drinking water resources because of inadequately cemented casing).
83. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, supra note 58, at 55 (stating that by 2025 this
number is expected to reach more than $3,500).
84. Id. at 42 (stating that by 2025 the sector is projected to provide 3.9 million
US jobs).
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1. Industrial Economic Impact
Many manufacturing industries of raw goods, such as bulk chemicals and
primary metals, are expanding and converting to the use of dry natural gas and
gas plant liquids (“NGPL”) feedstocks instead of petroleum-based feedstocks
because of the economic benefits.85 Natural gas has initiated a “manufacturing
renaissance” in Louisiana that will be responsible for $100 billion in planned
project investments over the next several years.86 These manufacturers use
natural gas “like a baker uses flour”; it is their “daily bread.”87 Nationally, the
value added in 2012 for the entire unconventional energy-value chain and
energy-related chain was more than $284 billion and is projected to reach
$533 billion by 2025.88 These increases will lead to increased government
revenues, from more than $74 billion in 2012 to a projected $138 billion in
2025, with a total collection of more than $1.6 trillion over this time period.89
2. Energy Independence
Hydraulic fracturing is instrumental in the United States’s mission to
become energy independent. Although the first attempt at the initiative under
the Nixon administration failed,90 the United States has resurrected this ideal
because of technological improvements making previously inaccessible oil
and gas accessible91 and the ability to avoid the risk and uncertainties
85. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10, at ES-1.
86. SCOTT & RICHARDSON, supra note 26, at iii (noting in 2014 that
“Louisiana is in the midst of an industrial boom unlike any other in our history,
with over $100 billion in industrial projects either under construction or at the
front-end engineering and design phase”); id. at 104 (projecting Louisiana to have
more than 2 million non-farm employees for the first time in history in 2015).
87. The Benefits of Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Oversight Field
Hearing before the Subcomm. On Energy and Mineral Resources, 109th Cong.
66 (2006) (statement of Dan Borne, President, Louisiana Chemical Association).
88. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, supra note 58, at 47.
89. Id. at 50.
90. Project Independence: Hearing Before the House Comm. of the Interior &
Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 1 (1975); see generally DOE Timeline: 1971-1980, DEP’T
OF ENERGY, http://web.archive.org/web/20060927141408/ http://www.mbe.doe.gov
/me70/history/1971-1980.htm [https://perma.cc/YFC7-27E9] (last visited Oct. 14,
2016).
91. See Joseph S. Nye, Shale Gas is America’s Geopolitical Trump Card,
WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2014, 6:26 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/joseph-nyeshale-gas-is-americas-geopolitical-trump-card-1402266357 [https://perma.cc/A3C
L-7NXF] (“The U.S. was regarded as increasingly dependent on energy imports and
was building terminals to import high-priced liquefied natural gas. Instead, North

556

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

associated with foreign producers.92 Since the inception of the shale boom,
the United States has steadily reduced its dependency on foreign energy
resources.93 By 2017, the United States is projected to be a net exporter of
natural gas,94 and by 2028, the United States is projected to be energy
neutral.95
3. Transition from Fossil Fuels to Renewables
Using natural gas to produce energy has played a tremendous role in the
United States’s effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.96 As an energy
producer, natural gas is considered a clean fuel alternative when compared to
other viable alternatives.97 On average, natural gas-fired power plants in the
America is now building terminals to export its low-cost LNG, and the continent is
expected to be self-sufficient in energy in the 2020s, according to a broad consensus
of energy experts. The Energy Department estimates that the country has 25 trillion
cubic meters of technically recoverable resources of shale gas, which when
combined with other oil-and-gas resources could last for two centuries.”); Bob
Abeshouse, American Power And The Fracking Boom, HUSSEINI ENERGY (Oct. 2,
2014), http://www.husseinienergy.com/media-center/in-the-press/american-powerand-the-fracking-boom/ [https://perma.cc/E3BD-26U4] (“After decades of fuel
dependency on the Middle East and elsewhere, fracking—the high pressure
extraction of oil and gas from shale—promises to make the United States energy
self-sufficient by 2030.”).
92. Tom Gjelten, Energy Independence For U.S.? Try Energy Security,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:37 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10
/25/163573768/energy-independence-for-u-s-try-energy-security [https://perma
.cc/WZK5-AR98] (discussing the importance of “energy security” to prevent
events similar to the oil boycott that several Arab countries imposed on the U.S.
in 1973).
93. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10, at 17 (2015) (arguing that net
imports of energy have declined from 30% of total consumption in 2005 to 13%
in 2013 because of strong growth in domestic oil and gas production from tight
formations).
94. Id. at ES-1 (projecting natural gas exports to continue growth after 2017
with projected net natural gas exports ranging from 3.0 trillion cubic feet (“tcf”)
and 13.1 tcf in 2040).
95. See id. at ES-3. A country that is energy neutral has equal amounts of
energy imports and exports.
96. Mike Orcutt, How and Why U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Are Falling,
MIT TECH. REV. (May 6, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/527106
/how-and-why-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-are-falling/ [https://perma.cc/EP4J-N7
RC].
97. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATURAL GAS: AIR EMISSIONS,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150905095003/http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/ener
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United States emit half the carbon dioxide, less than a third of the nitrogen
oxides, and about 1% of the sulfur oxides that their coal-powered counterparts
emit for the same quantity of energy production.98 In 2013, the U.S. energy
sector emissions reached their lowest level since 1994.99 Cheap natural gas
prices and the industry’s willingness to convert to a cheaper and cleaner fuel
largely attributed to this reduction.100 In 2013, total emissions in the United
States were only 4.7% higher than they were in 1994, while total emissions in
2007 were 17.5% above the 1994 levels.101 This reduction correlates with an
increase in coal prices and a significant decrease in the price of natural gas
in 2009.102 In April 2012, energy production from natural gas reached the
same level as coal for the first time in recorded history.103 As methods to
increase energy production from renewable resources, such as water,
wind, and solar sources, are made more efficient, natural gas is a clean
“transition fuel” that might bridge the gap between coal and renewables.104
Renewable electricity generation is expected to increase 72% by 2040;105
moreover, between 2025 and 2040, projections show that natural gas will
gy-and-you/affect/natural-gas.html#footnotes [https://perma.cc/SVW7-XDFY] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2016).
98. Id.
99. CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, LEVERAGING NATURAL GAS
TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, at v (2013), https://www.c2es.org/docUp
loads/leveraging-natural-gas-reduce-ghg-emissions-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/R
ZK5-GHQX].
100. See Orcutt, supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TRENDS IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 2–3
(2014), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHGInventory-2014-Chapter-2-Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/M556-MVEN] (stating
that other factors include the economic downturn and less energy-intensive weather
conditions).
103. Monthly Coal-and Natural Gas-Fired Generation Equal for First Time in
April 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (July 6, 2012), http://www.eia.gov
/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6990 [https://perma.cc/B9DM-LTGD].
104. Interview with Gina McCarthy, Administrator, US Envtl. Prot. Agency,
in Washington D.C. (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint
/Documents/Events/RFF-Sept25-GinaMcCarthyPLF.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GY
L-N2DD] (“Let me start off by saying that natural gas in the US has been a game
changer. The abundance of low-cost natural gas has really started an energy
transition that we are really taking advantage of and hoping to follow through our
111(d) process, so it’s been a significant benefit to the United States. It’s been a
significant benefit to air quality, because it’s allowed us some room to address
pollution, pollutants like mercury in a way that maintains reliability because it’s
accessible and it’s affordable.”).
105. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10, at ES-6.
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be the fuel source for 60% of all new electricity generation, with renewable
fuels supplementing the remaining generation.106 Consequently, energyrelated carbon dioxide emissions are projected to remain below 2007
levels through 2040.107
Natural gas benefits the average citizen both directly and indirectly
and has become an essential part of the American economy. As the
industry transitions from fossil fuels to renewable resources, cheap natural
gas provides a cleaner energy source than coal and leads to more jobs in
the U.S. because of increased manufacturing. Natural gas as an industry
has grown exponentially in the past decade with the increased use of
hydraulic fracturing, and the projected benefits of increased natural gas
production are inconceivable without the continued use of hydraulic
fracturing.108
II. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING LITIGATION
Natural gas is and will likely continue to be a valuable asset to the
current U.S. economy. However, because of the industry’s rapid growth,
it is unclear whether the technology and increased use of hydraulic
fracturing will outpace the regulatory framework that keeps other similar
industries in check.109 Some argue that the solution to the lapse in
regulation is imposing strict liability to encourage companies engaged in
hydraulic fracturing to apply the highest standards of safety and alleviate
some of the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs injured by groundwater
contamination.110 However, imposing strict liability will still leave injured
parties without a means of equitable relief because the most difficult
burden, that of proving causation, remains.

106. Id. at 24.
107. Id. at 27 (“The main factors influencing CO2 emissions include substitution
of natural gas for coal in electricity generation, increases in the use of renewable
energy, improvements in vehicle fuel economy, and increases in the efficiencies of
appliances and industrial processes.”); see id. at 26 fig.36.
108. Natural Gas from Shale, supra note 56.
109. See Jason T. Gerken, Comment, What the Frack Shale We Do? A
Proposed Environmental Regulatory Scheme for Hydraulic Fracturing, 41 CAP.
U.L. REV. 81 (2013); Alexander T. Maur, Note, Let’s Not Frack This Up: Statebased Solutions for the Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing and the Disposal of
Flowback Water, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 151 (2015).
110. See Hannah Coman, Note, Balancing the Need for Clean Energy and
Clean Water: The Case for Applying Strict Liability in Hydraulic Fracturing
Suits, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 131, 15459 (2012).
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The most common claims brought in hydraulic fracturing suits are
trespass, negligence, nuisance, and strict liability for ultra-hazardous
activities.111 Causation is an essential element to each of these theories of
liability112 and is often the element that plaintiffs are incapable of proving.
To survive a motion for directed verdict, plaintiffs must provide sufficient
evidence that hydraulic fracturing activities caused the contamination of
the groundwater,113 in addition to the other elements that the specific
theory of liability being pursued requires.114
A. Alleging Contamination
Given the circumstances of the hydraulic fracturing process and the
numerous potential sources of contamination, proving causation in
groundwater contamination cases places a nearly insurmountable burden
on plaintiffs. Although groundwater contamination does not occur in a
widespread or systemic manner,115 it has occurred.116 As natural gas
becomes the primary source of energy in the United States,117 the use of
hydraulic fracturing will continue to increase at an expansive rate. Expanded
use of the activity consequently escalates the likelihood of increased
occurrences of contamination, whether due to operator error or an
unforeseeable circumstance.
The standard of evidence required to prove groundwater contamination
is nearly impossible to reach because baseline water composition data is
lacking,118 the source of the contamination is located miles beneath the
surface,119 and the contamination might take years to infiltrate the
groundwater.120 In cases in which groundwater pollution in fracking areas is
111. See, e.g., King, supra note 48, at 344, n.17 (citing multiple sources).
112. See, e.g., id. at 345 n.21; Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d
518 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
113. Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578, 586–87 (5th Cir. 2002).
114. King, supra note 48, at 346.
115. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-6.
116. See id. at 10-20.
117. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10, at 27.
118. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11.
119. AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 12, at 7.
120. U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-56–6-57. (“Given the
surge in the number of modern high-pressure hydraulic fracturing operations
dating from the early 2000s, evidence of any fracturing-related fluid migration
affecting a drinking water resource (as well as the information necessary to
connect specific well operation practices to a drinking water impact) could take
years to discover.”); Gerken, supra note 109, at 99 (proposing that an “enhanced
regulatory framework could give a landowner the tools to make a case in state
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confirmed, but insufficient evidence exists to establish the required factual
link between the fracturing and water contamination, common law remedies
are incapable of providing equitable relief for injured plaintiffs.121
B. Liability for Negligence
In jurisdictions that do not recognize strict liability tort actions for
abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous activities, plaintiffs often turn to
alternative theories such as negligence.122 The burden of proving causation
remains a barrier for plaintiffs, however, because of the inability to obtain
evidence of the defendant’s breach of duty and evidence establishing that
breach caused the injury. The following elements are those most
commonly required for a finding of liability stemming from negligence:
first, the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; second,
the defendant’s breach of that duty; third, that the breach caused the injury;
and fourth, that the plaintiff suffered injury because of the breach.123
In Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., the Anthony family brought claims
for the negligent contamination of groundwater and soil on the family
ranch caused by the hydraulic fracturing of two separate wells.124 The
family had baseline water test data from 1973 to 1975 showing that the
water chloride level was roughly 60 parts per million (“ppm”), a suitable
level for human consumption, but by 1988, the level had increased and far
exceeded a level safe for human consumption.125 The family claimed the
contamination was due to hydraulic fracturing operations that Chevron
performed from 1979 to 1989 to increase production.126 To succeed, the
plaintiffs had to prove the four elements of negligence liability, and
predictably, the plaintiffs had difficulty proving causation.
To meet the evidentiary burden of causation, the plaintiffs provided
the testimony of two expert witnesses.127 Through one expert’s testimony,
the plaintiffs established that one of the Chevron wells was leaking

court in the distant future, if not create alternative causes of action to be brought
immediately in federal court under existing environmental statutes”).
121. Gerken, supra note 109.
122. See King, supra note 48, at 344. The terms “abnormally dangerous” and
“ultra-hazardous” are used interchangeably in this Comment.
123. Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578, 583 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing
Mosley v. Excel Corp., 109 F.3d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1997)).
124. Id. at 582.
125. Id. at 581 (explaining that the chloride level reached 980 ppm by 1988).
126. Id. at 582.
127. Id. at 584.
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through the casing in multiple areas.128 Additionally, the expert established
that Chevron had initiated a fracture that extended vertically from the
production zone and theorized that the continued use of high-pressure
saltwater injections over several years had caused the fracture to continue
upward, which caused contamination of the groundwater aquifer.129
Although the plaintiffs established the water was contaminated and
proposed several fact-based theories for how Chevron could have caused
the contamination, the court determined that the experts had not
established a sufficient factual link between Chevron’s operations and the
contamination of the groundwater.130
The court offered advice for bridging this evidentiary gap in stating,
“[t]he well could have presumably been tested or a separate well could
have been dug in the vicinity of these point sources to search for higher
pollution.”131 These recommendations would have imposed additional
costs on the plaintiffs, aside from the cost of the two experts who were
already hired. Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiffs failed to
address the possibility that other subsequent operators caused the
contamination, implying an additional burden of requiring a plaintiff to
prove not only that the defendant contaminated the groundwater, but also
that other operators did not contaminate it.132
The evidence presented in Anthony was more extensive than that
submitted by most plaintiffs in similar suits because the plaintiffs in
Anthony were able to prove that contamination occurred with baseline
water data as well as factually plausible sources of fluid migration from
the defendant’s fracturing wells.133 However, the evidence was insufficient
to establish the factual nexus between the contaminant source and the
contaminated water.134 This scenario demonstrates the significant burden
128. Id. at 584–86 (relying on the temperature log, which revealed that the well
was leaking through numerous holes in its casing from 2,016 feet to 1,924 feet, and
at 1,390 feet below the surface, roughly 1,300 feet below the contaminated aquifer).
129. Id. at 586–87 (establishing that Chevron initiated a fracture that extended
vertically from the production zone 166 feet towards the aquifer and theorizing
that Chevron’s continued use of high-pressure saltwater injections over several
years after the initial fracture had caused the fracture to continue upward, thus
causing contamination of the aquifer, which was roughly 1,500 feet above).
130. The experts provided proof that the fracturing fluids had ventured farther
than Chevron might have intended, but the plaintiff could not factually prove that
the fluid had migrated an additional 1,300 to 1,500 feet to the groundwater and
caused the contamination. Id.
131. Id. at 586.
132. Id. at 587.
133. Id. at 586–87.
134. Id. at 590.
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injured plaintiffs face when bringing contamination suits under a negligence
theory.
C. Strict Liability
The elements required to find that hydraulic fracturing is an ultrahazardous activity subject to strict liability vary among the states. The cause
of action is intended to impose liability for actions that are abnormally
dangerous regardless of whether the utmost care is exercised during the
operation.135 The activity is continued because the utility derived from the
activity justifies the risk of proceeding.136 The essential question is not
whether the defendant acted negligently, but rather whether the activity itself
presents an abnormal degree of risk that cannot be alleviated by operating with
the utmost care.137 Some argue that strict liability is the best means to permit
equitable relief to plaintiffs injured by hydraulic fracturing activities.138
Pennsylvania has adopted the analysis set forth in The Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 519 and section 520 for determining whether an
activity is abnormally dangerous.139 Section 519 states that “[o]ne who carries
on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm . . . of
another resulting from the activity, although he exercised the utmost care to
prevent the harm.”140 To determine whether the activity is “abnormally
dangerous,” section 520 enumerates a six-factor test. These factors are as
follows: first, the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land, or chattels of others; second, the likelihood that the resulting harm will
be great; third, the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care; fourth, the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
fifth, the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and sixth, the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.141 Pennsylvania plaintiffs have not yet been able to
present the required evidence to establish hydraulic fracturing and other
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
136. Id. § 520 cmt. b.
137. See Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 518, 529 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
138. Coman, supra note 110, at 15459.
139. See, e.g., Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 529 (adopting §§ 519 and 520 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts); Diffenderfer v. Staner, 722 A.2d 1103, 1107 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998) (same); Melso v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 576 A.2d 999, 1002–03 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) (same); Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1219–20 (1995)
(same); Albig v. Municipal Auth. of Westmoreland Cnty., 502 A.2d 658, 662–63
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
141. Id. § 520.
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similar injection activities142 as abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous
activities.143 These plaintiffs generally revert to other theories of liability such
as negligence, which make recovery more difficult because of the additional
case-specific evidentiary burdens.144
Arkansas has developed a simplified two-part test to determine whether
an activity is ultra-hazardous. If the gas production activity “necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm . . . which cannot be eliminated by the exercise
of the utmost care and is not a matter of common usage,” the activity is ultrahazardous.145 Arkansas courts have implemented a standard similar to
Pennsylvania’s by permitting a full record to be established and withholding
judgment until discovery is complete.146 In contrast, Texas does not recognize
a cause of action of strict liability for “abnormally dangerous” or “ultrahazardous” activities for oil and gas operations.147 Instead, Texas plaintiffs
generally bring negligence claims,148 in which the evidentiary showing is
more cumbersome.
142. See Melso, 576 A.2d at 1003 (finding that operating a pipeline in an urban
area was not abnormally dangerous); Smith, 665 A.2d at 1220 (finding that
underground gasoline storage tanks are not ultra-hazardous or abnormally
dangerous because they are common, can be dealt with safely, and are valuable to
society); Diffenderfer, 722 A.2d at 1107 (holding that the storage of toxic
insecticide in a barn was not abnormally dangerous).
143. See Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d 518.
144. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993)
In order to prevail on a cause of action in negligence under Pennsylvania
law, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a duty or obligation recognized by the
law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2)
a failure to conform to the standard required; (3) a causal connection
between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage resulting to the interests of another.
(citing WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971)). These
other claims are more burdensome for plaintiffs because they have to prove the
injuring party’s actions fall below the required standard of duty, which is not
required for strict liability claims.
145. Zero Wholesale Gas Co. v. Stroud, 571 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Ark. 1978)
(emphasis omitted).
146. Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20697, *10 (E.D. Ark.
Feb. 17, 2012) (first citing Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d
506, 511–12 (M.D. Pa. 2010); and then citing Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co.,
763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (M.D. Pa. 2011)).
147. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tex. 1936) (declining
to apply a strict liability standard in oil and gas operations); Harris v. Devon Energy
Prod. Co., No. 4:10-CV-708, 2012 WL 220212 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2012), aff’d as
modified 500 Fed. App’x. 267 (5th Cir. 2012).
148. See Harris, 2012 WL 220212.

564

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

Prior to 1996, article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code imposed absolute
liability for damage that the proprietor of an estate caused on his neighbor’s
property by ultra-hazardous activities.149 In 1996, however, the legislature
amended article 667 and limited its application to pile driving and blasting
activities.150 Before the amendment, Louisiana required four elements to be
met to impose strict liability related to an ultra-hazardous activity: first, the
activity had to be related to the immovable; second, the activity itself must
have caused the injury; third, the defendant must have directly engaged in the
activity; and fourth, the activity must have had the ability to cause injury,
regardless of a party’s substandard conduct.151 Numerous methods have been
used to determine the standard for “substandard conduct” that the third
element requires,152 but substandard conduct is generally deemed to require
the activity to be capable of causing injury “even when conducted with the
greatest prudence and care.”153 Although Louisiana does not currently
recognize a cause of action for hydraulic fracturing as an ultra-hazardous
activity, modifying article 667 to permit these claims would not alleviate the
burden of causation.
The theories of liability currently available to injured plaintiffs do not
promote equitable relief for groundwater contaminations that have already
occurred. Both legislators154 and scholars155 have debated whether hydraulic
fracturing should be considered an ultra-hazardous activity and, consequently,
149. See Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 211 So. 2d 627 (La. 1968) (pile
driving); Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 80 So. 2d 845 (La. 1955)
(blasting); Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So. 2d 293 (La. 1957) (herbicide crop dusting);
Updike v. Browning-Farris, 808 F. Supp. 538, 542–43 (W.D. La. 1992) (storing
hazardous waste); Hampton v. Rubicon Chems., Inc., 458 So. 2d 1260, 1268 (La.
1984); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971) (storage of
poisonous gas).
150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (1996); see also Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish
Gov't., 907 So. 2d 37 (La. 2005) (affirming the amended code article).
151. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 126768 (5th Cir. 1985).
152. Updike, 808 F. Supp. at 542–43 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss
to permit a factual inquiry based on a fully developed record, but also noting that
if the ultra-hazardous determination can be based on an analogy to other cases,
the court would conclude that the storage of hazardous waste in pits is an ultrahazardous activity).
153. Triplette v. Exxon Corp., 554 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
154. Timothy Wheeler, Lawmakers Wade Into Debate Over Fracking in
Western Maryland, BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com
/features/green/blog/bal-lawmakers-wade-into-debate-over-fracking-in-westernmaryland-20150303-story.html [https://perma.cc/3DGM-CQF9].
155. See generally Coman, supra note 110; King, supra note 48; Schremmer,
supra note 36.
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subject to strict liability. Regardless of whether strict liability or negligence
liability applies, the primary evidentiary burden of causation remains the
same. Plaintiffs lack the information to prove the factual link required by
courts to prove the defendant caused the contamination;156 thus, taken in the
aggregate, this same lack of a factual link over time prevents a finding that
hydraulic fracturing is an abnormally dangerous activity.157 And, regardless
of whether hydraulic fracturing is considered abnormally dangerous, the risk
factor will not weigh heavily against the overall utility of the activity until
sufficient evidence from multiple contamination claims provides a factual link
between hydraulic fracturing and groundwater contamination.
Ultimately, the lack of causation evidence in contamination cases has two
possible explanations: either hydraulic fracturing does not cause groundwater
contamination, or it occasionally does cause contamination but the practice is
not sufficiently studied and monitored to establish a record of the
contamination. An EPA study158 and several plaintiffs159 have established that
oil and gas activities have contaminated groundwater resources, which proves
the latter scenario more plausible. In instances where equitable relief is not
available to injured parties through ex post160 tort liability, a robust ex ante161
regulatory strategy might be necessary to reduce the occurrence of harm by
establishing safe standards and best practices.
III. CURRENT REGULATIONS
A number of reasons exist as to why the controversy over the longterm detrimental effects of hydraulic fracturing has reached considerable
proportions. Clean water is a finite resource, in some locations more than
others, that is usually found underground.162 Pumping large quantities of
156. King, supra note 48, at 344.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(requiring the “existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others”).
158. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-57.
159. See, e.g., Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2002);
Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 518 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
160. Ex post regulation, such as tort liability, imposes monetary damages on
injuring parties after the injury has occurred. See Thomas Merrill & David
Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water
Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 212 (2013).
161. Ex ante regulations attempt to reduce the risk of injury before their
occurrence by imposing industry standards and requirements. Id. at 215.
162. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/601/R-12/004, SAFE AND
SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES: STRATEGIC RESEARCH ACTION PLAN 2012–
2016, at 7 (2012).
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pressurized blends of toxic chemicals into the ground over several years
will likely have a detrimental effect. However, as long as industries with
similar risks, such as nuclear power plants and chemical manufacturing
plants, are regulated to alleviate the risk involved, the general public is
more likely to accept this risk.163 When activities perceived to impose a
high risk of harm are left largely unregulated, such as hydraulic fracturing,
the talking points align and the ensuing controversy leads to a largely
misinformed debate.
A. Federal Regulations
Hydraulic fracturing and other oil and gas activities are exempted from
several of the major federal environmental regulations that similar
industries are required to follow, which removes any reassurances of
regulatory oversight from the public opinion. The Clean Water Act
(“CWA”) is intended to maintain and restore the biological integrity of
surface water by preventing pollution sources in navigable waterways.164
The objective of the CWA is to protect surface water as opposed to
groundwater, both of which are currently being used as sources of drinking
water.165 Contamination of surface waters by hydraulic fracturing
activities, however, would not activate the CWA regulations because of
several exemptions. The operators of oil and gas exploration and
production facilities are not required to obtain CWA permits for the stormwater runoff from these facilities, which effectively exempts these
activities.166 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 expanded this exemption to
exempt pollution caused by activities necessary for the preparation of the
site and for movement and placement of the drilling equipment at these
facilities.167
The Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) required all “underground
injection” activities to obtain a permit and be regulated by an approved
Underground Injection Control (“UIC”) program before 2005.168 UIC
programs required the applicant to show that the underground injection
would not endanger drinking water and required inspection, monitoring,
163. Ayesha Rascoe, Fracking Regulations Could Ease Public Concerns: White
House, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2011, 3:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usnatgas-fracking-regulation-idUSTRE73P6DV20110426 [https://perma.cc/CSE9QURE].
164. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
165. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-3.
166. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2).
167. Id. § 1362(24).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b) (2012).
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and recordkeeping of the well activities.169 Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s
ruling that hydraulic fracturing “fit[s] squarely” within the defined class
of “underground injections,”170 Congress exempted hydraulic fracturing
from the SDWA171 in a controversial act colloquially known as the
“Halliburton Loophole.”172 This exemption was controversial because
many viewed it as an endorsement of oil and gas companies’ continued
operations, even though the effects of hydraulic fracturing could not be
conclusively stated.173
Additionally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) exempts oil and natural gas
from the definition of “hazardous waste.”174 The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act subsection C regulates the disposal of hazardous waste
products but, similar to CERCLA, contains a provision exempting “drilling
fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration,
development, or production of crude oil or natural gas.”175 The Clean Air
Act (“CAA”) grants direct control to the EPA over areas satisfying the
“major source” criteria.176 When sources of air pollution like drilling and
pumping equipment are within a contiguous area, such as a fracking site, the
pollution of all sources are aggregated to establish the total pollution
aggregate for the area.177 If the total pollution aggregate surpasses the CAA
169. Id.
170. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. (LEAF), Inc. v. EPA, 276 F.3d 1253,
1263 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit rejected the EPA’s interpretation that
“underground injection” did not include hydraulic fracturing activities. The
EPA’s interpretation included only wells “whose ‘principal function’ is the
underground emplacement of fluids,” and hydraulic fracturing would be excluded
because its primary function is the production of product. Id. at 1471.
171. The exemption was part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and is not
applicable when the fracturing fluid contains diesel. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii).
172. See The Halliburton Loophole, EARTHWORKS, http://www.earthworks
action.org/issues/detail/inadequate_regulation_of_hydraulic_fracturing#.VRMaZC
lN3zI [https://perma.cc/6KBW-UPF9] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). The 1997 LEAF
decision happened while the EPA was under the Clinton Administration and the
“Halliburton Loophole” occurred during a Republican majority in Congress. This
distinction supports the notion that the lack of federal regulation is largely based on
economic concerns and not on partisan issues.
173. Adam Garmezy, Balancing Hydraulic Fracturing's Environmental and
Economic Impacts: The Need for a Comprehensive Federal Baseline and the
Provision of Local Rights, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 405, 407–10 (2013).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii).
175. Id. § 6921(b)(2)(A).
176. Id. § 7412(a)(1).
177. Id.
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threshold, the EPA will issue regulations to achieve the maximum
reduction of these emissions.178 However, the statute later declares that
emissions from “any oil or gas exploration or production well . . . [are not]
aggregated for any purpose under this section.”179 It was not until April of
2012 that the EPA finally issued the first federal air standards for
qualifying hydraulically fractured wells.180
Presumably awaiting further study and information from the EPA,
Congress has allowed the expiration of several bills intended to modify
these federal regulations.181 The draft of the five-year study was finally
released in June 2015. However, the inconclusive statements in the report,
citing a lack of pre- and post-fracturing data,182 only further the notion that
Congress and the EPA lack the same contamination evidence as plaintiffs,
which has proven detrimental to plaintiffs’ claims. These exemptions
show that the federal government is either unable or unwilling to enforce
the same regulatory standards on hydraulic fracturing operations as it
imposes on other similar industries. Consequently, the regulation of
hydraulic fracturing is largely left to the states.
B. State Regulations
A comprehensive federal regulatory strategy would be cumbersome
and largely impractical given that the practice of hydraulic fracturing can
vary significantly by rock formation and other regional conditions. States
are in a better position to develop regulatory strategies because of their
knowledge of their respective geologies and other local concerns.183 Many
state regulatory agencies, however, are already understaffed for purposes
of handling the increased workload that the shale boom caused and would
likely find it difficult to propose and implement new regulations governing
178. Id. § 7412(d)(2)(A).
179. 42 U.S.C § 7412(n)(4)(A).
180. 40 C.F.R. § 60.5375 (2012).
181. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (“FRAC”) Act of
2011, H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (2011); Fracturing Regulations Are Effective in
State Hands (FRESH) Act, S. 2248, 112th Cong. (2012).
182. The report found that contamination has occurred through multiple
avenues in a relatively small number of cases, but notes that the number of cases
might be understated because of insufficient pre- and post-fracturing data of the
groundwater resources. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 10-20.
183. Wes Deweese, Fracturing Misconceptions: A History of Effective State
Regulation, Groundwater, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6 OKLA. J.L. & TECH.
49, May 2010, at 1, 31, https://www.law.ou.edu/sites/default/files/files/FACULTY
/2010okjoltrev49.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ2X-CGV6].
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hydraulic fracturing that require heavy oversight.184 If hydraulic fracturing
continues in its projected growth pattern, regulations requiring oversight
at any level will likely be impractical without the allocation of significant
additional resources. Any proposed regulations should provide a benefit
that the cost of enforcing the regulations balances to prevent the stifling of
the industry or overburdening of regulatory agencies.
1. Baseline Water Testing
Various states have implemented different forms of regulation on the
hydraulic fracturing industry. Baseline water testing alleviates the states’
regulatory strain by imposing the burden of testing and monitoring on the
companies engaging in the potentially hazardous activity. Several states
require baseline water testing of the water resources within a certain radius
of the well.185 Baseline water testing provides valuable information to state
regulators, fracking operators, and injured plaintiffs. The testing
establishes a record of the chemical composition of the water before
hydraulic fracturing occurred in the area.186 This baseline composition can
then be compared to new water tests to determine if and when
contamination has occurred.187 If contamination has occurred, the data

184. See Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y F. 361, 371 (2012) (“Some state agencies tasked with executing
environmental regulations - often in addition to ensuring oil and gas conservation
and protecting mineral rights - have been overwhelmed by the pace and volume
of new well development.”). In Texas, the number of wells drilled increased by
75% from 2003 to 2008 while the regulatory staff increased by only 4% over the
same time period. With over 273,000 wells in Texas in 2009, the administrative
burden of additional regulations would be tremendous. How Big is the Gas
Drilling Regulatory Staff in Your State?, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica
.org/gas-drilling-regulatory-staffing/states/TX.html [https://perma.cc/LFQ6-8E6
9] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). In Louisiana, the number of new wells drilled
annually increased by 42% between 2003 and 2009, while the regulatory staff
increased by only 3%. Id.
185. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1509.06(A)(8)(c) (West 2016) (requiring
testing of water sources within 1,500 feet of the well); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
113–423(f) (West 2016) (requiring the testing of water sources within 5,000 feet
of the well).
186. See Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing and the Baseline Testing of
Groundwater, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 857, 870 (2014).
187. Id. at 871.
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might also be used in conjunction with fracking fluid chemical
compositions to determine which operator caused the contamination.188
Some operators in states without mandatory testing perform the
baseline testing on a voluntary basis.189 Presumably, operators performing
voluntary testing do so as part of their well monitoring and information
gathering, as well as to create an evidentiary record showing that they have
not caused contamination.190 Several states, such as Colorado, Illinois,
North Carolina, Ohio, and Wyoming, require mandatory baseline water
testing before the fracturing of wells.191 These requirements typically vary
by the number of water sources that must be tested, the anticipated impact
radius, and the population density of the drilling area.192 The radius of
water sources that must be tested varies significantly, from 1,500 feet in
Ohio to 5,000 feet in North Carolina, with the variation presumably based
on the various states’ tailoring of their regulations to fit unique geologic
formations and other conditions.193
Illinois requires baseline water testing before hydraulic fracturing and
places a particularly onerous presumption of liability against the operator.
The presumption is applied if pollution of a water source occurs within
1,500 feet of the well site and is shown to have occurred within 30 months
of the hydraulic fracturing operation.194 Rebutting this presumption
requires the operator to affirmatively prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the water source was not within 1,500 feet of the well site,
that the pollution did not occur during the 30-month window, or to prove
another cause of the contamination.195 This form of presumption places the
operator in the same position as plaintiffs in other states because the
operator lacks the evidence to prove a factual link between the source of
188. For an in depth discussion of baseline groundwater testing see id. at 887–
89.
189. See id. at 874; see Voluntary Baseline Water Sampling Guideline, N.M.
OIL & GAS ASSOC., http://www.nmoga.org/voluntary-baseline-water-samplingguideline [https://perma.cc/2MCY-7L7Y] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
190. See Hall, supra note 186, at 874.
191. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404–1:609(b) (2016); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732
732/1–80(b) (2016).; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 113–423(f) (West 2016); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. 1509.06(A)(8)(b)–(c) (2016); 055-003 WYO. CODE R., § 46(a)
(LexisNexis 2016).
192. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732/1-80(b).
193. Cf. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80
Fed. Reg. 16,183 (proposed Mar. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160)
(deciding against a national requirement for baseline testing partially because
local authorities are better informed of their specific geologic conditions).
194. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732/1-85(b).
195. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732/1-85(c).
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the contaminant and the actual contamination. These presumptions might
incentivize safe practices by operators to an extent, but they will likely
stifle the industry for fear of liability for contaminations caused by third
parties.196
Other states, such as Pennsylvania and West Virginia, do not require
operators to perform baseline testing, but encourage the exercise by
establishing evidentiary presumptions against operators who decline to do
so. Pennsylvania establishes a presumption of liability against operators of
unconventional wells where water contamination occurs within 2,500 feet
of the wellbore and the pollution occurs within 12 months of completion,
drilling, stimulation, or alteration.197 This presumption is rebuttable,
however, with pre-drilling baseline water data proving that the
contamination existed before drilling or that the landowner refused testing.198
Incentivizing the performance of baseline testing alleviates some of the
issues related to contamination litigation by improving a plaintiff’s chances of
proving at least a portion of the factual nexus required. It also provides
evidence that can protect defendant operators when their particular operations
are not the cause of the alleged contamination. Despite the perceived benefits
associated with requiring baseline water testing before hydraulic fracturing,
including enhanced data acquisition and safer production, Louisiana does not
require any form of baseline water testing.199
2. Chemical Disclosures
In a recent study on the impact of hydraulic fracturing on groundwater
resources, the EPA identified more than 1,000 chemicals—including
acids, alcohols, aromatic hydrocarbons, bases, hydrocarbon mixtures,
polysaccharides, and surfactants—used in various quantities in hydraulic
196. North Carolina has a similar rebuttable presumption. The presumption is
rebuttable, however, with a more lenient standard of preponderance of the
evidence. To rebut the presumption, the evidence must show that the water supply
is not within a half mile of the well, the contamination occurred prior to the
fracturing, a separate cause for the contamination existed, or that the owner
refused the baseline water testing. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 113–421(a1) (West
2016). The statute also requires that operators causing contamination must
provide to the users of the water supply a replacement water supply that is
adequate in quality and quantity for their use, in addition to any other damages.
Id.. § 113–421(a5).
197. 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218(c) (West 2016). West
Virginia has similar statutes to encourage baseline testing, but they require a
reduced radius of 1,500 feet. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6A-18 (West 2016).
198. 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218(d)(2).
199. See infra Part V.B.1 for detailed discussion.

572

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

fracturing operations.200 Prior to 2010, operators did not have to disclose
the chemicals contained in their fracturing fluid in any state.201 Currently,
the majority of states permitting hydraulic fracturing activities have some
form of disclosure requirements.202 Many states permit the disclosure to
Fracfocus, an easily accessible online registry of fracturing fluid compositions
being used in wells across the country.203
Full-disclosure states, such as Arkansas204 and Texas,205 require that all
chemicals added to the fracturing fluid be disclosed by type and concentration,
including specific names of each additive, to the director.206 Once disclosed
to the director, the operator may apply to have any trade-secret portion
withheld from the subsequent public disclosure.207 The director of the
regulating agency must keep the qualifying trade-secret chemicals
confidential.208 Because trade-secret chemicals might hold tremendous
value, some states might prefer a partial-disclosure strategy because of
liability concerns associated with holding the full-disclosure trade-secret
chemicals confidential.
Several states, such as Michigan209 and Louisiana,210 have a partialdisclosure requirement for chemicals used during hydraulic fracturing. In
partial-disclosure states, the operator is required to disclose all of the
chemicals added to the fracturing fluid unless the chemicals are protected
as trade secrets.211 If the chemicals are trade secrets, the operator may
choose to disclose the chemical family of the trade-secret chemical
200. The ten most common chemicals are methanol, hydrotreated light petroleum
distillates, hydrochloric acid, isopropanol, ethylene glycol, peroxydisulfuric acid
diammonium salt, sodium hydroxide, guar gum, glutaraldehyde, and propargyl
alcohol. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 5-72.
201. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory
Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 406 (2013).
Noting that Wyoming became the first state to require fracturing fluid chemical
disclosures in 2010.
202. Fracfocus.org contains a database of the disclosure regulations of each
state. FRACFOCUS, supra note 46.
203. Id. (allows operators to disclose the chemical composition of their
hydraulic fracturing treatments either voluntarily or mandatorily).
204. 178.00.1-B-19 ARK. CODE R. § (l)–(m) (LexisNexis 2015).
205. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(2) (2016).
206. Id. § 3.29(c)(2)(A). The “director” in Texas is the director of the Oil and
Gas Division of the Railroad Commission of Texas. Id. § 3.29(a)(13).
207. Id. § 3.29(c)(2)(C).
208. Id. § 3.29(e).
209. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.1406 (2016).
210. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, §118(C)(1)(b) (2016).
211. Id. §118(C)(2)(a) (2016); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.1406(2).
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instead.212 The non-trade-secret chemicals are first disclosed to the state
and then to the public.213
The trend of states requiring public disclosure is helpful in establishing
public reassurance that the industry is being regulated and monitored.
Landowners and concerned citizens alike are able to access this data and
personally inspect the chemicals being injected near them, and operator
employees can determine what types of chemicals are on their jobsite.214
Additionally, the disclosed chemicals may be compared to baseline water
tests in states requiring them to determine which operator might be the
most likely source of contamination.215 Operators can also compare their
fluid compositions with other companies and adjust them to better suit the
specific rock formation or location.
3. Fracturing Bans
In contrast, some jurisdictions have outright bans on hydraulic
fracturing, such as the country of France216 and several states, including
Vermont,217 Maryland,218 and New York.219 Such bans should be
212. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, §118(C)(2)(a)(i); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.
324.1406(2).
213. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, § 118(C)(f)(5).
214. FRACFOCUS, supra note 46.
215. See generally Hall, supra note 186, at 870.
216. Tara Patel, France Vote Outlaws ‘Fracking’ Shale for Natural Gas and Oil
Extraction, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2011, 5:22 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2011-07-01/france-vote-outlaws-fracking-shale-for-natural-gas-oil-extrac
tion [https://perma.cc/ZCZ6-7BM5].
217. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 571(a) (West 2016); Vermont First State to Ban
Fracking, CNN (May 17, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/17
/us/vermont-fracking/ [https://perma.cc/AK9K-U7G8]. Because Vermont does not
have any proven natural gas resources, however, the law has been compared to
banning offshore drilling in Oklahoma. A Fracking Fixation in Vermont,
OKLAHOMAN (May 19, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/3676611
[https://perma.cc/B9AB-ELQE].
218. Josh Hicks, Md. Fracking Moratorium to Become Law without Hogan’s
Signature, WASH. POST (May 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdpolitics/md-fracking-moratorium-to-become-law-without-hogans-signature/2015/05
/29/e1d10434-062c-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4e_story.html [https://perma.cc/PE6ZHDRR] (The Maryland law is a two year moratorium on additional fracturing that
expires in October 2017.).
219. Freeman Klopott, N.Y. Officially Bans Fracking with Release of Seven-Year
Study, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2015-06-29/n-y-officially-bans-fracking-with-release-of-seven-year-study
[https://perma.cc/P8PR-2SB4].
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considered only in areas where the specific geologic formations, along
with other conditions, do not lend themselves to the safe practice of
hydraulic fracturing. Because hydraulic fracturing is a necessity to the
current and future economy,220 solutions that increase innovation and the
safety of the practice should be preferred over outright bans.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Proving negligence in Louisiana requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the conduct in question was a cause in fact of the resulting harm, the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the duty was breached, and the risk
and harm caused were within the scope of the duty breached.221 The
evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to succeed in a negligence claim is
nearly impossible to overcome in contamination cases,222 with causation
being the most difficult element to prove.223 However, proving that the
defendant was negligent and actually breached a duty is often just as
difficult for plaintiffs in contamination cases involving hydraulic
fracturing.
A. Burden on the Claimant
In most cases, if contamination occurs, the fracturing fluid’s migration
through the subsurface formations to reach the groundwater would likely
take years.224 Any changes in mineral lease ownership during that time
would further complicate the plaintiff’s evidentiary requirements. Over
several decades, the operator of a specific well or unit portion might
change several times, and operators may begin fracturing operations on
nearby lands as well, thus increasing the number of companies that might
220. See supra Part I.
221. See Mart v. Hill, 505 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (La. 1987); Hill v. Lundin &
Associates, Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (1972); see also Timothy J. McNamara, The
Duties and Risks of the Duty-Risk Analysis, 44 LA. L. REV. 1227 (1984); David
W. Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v.
Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
222. See supra Part II.A.
223. King, supra note 48, at 346; Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d
578, 587–88 (5th Cir. 2002).
224. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-56–6-57. (“Given the
surge in the number of modern high-pressure hydraulic fracturing operations
dating from the early 2000s, evidence of any fracturing-related fluid migration
affecting a drinking water resource (as well as the information necessary to
connect specific well operation practices to a drinking water impact) could take
years to discover.”).
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have caused the injury. Under a negligence theory, the plaintiff would have
to prove which company caused the contamination by establishing a factual
nexus between that company’s operations and the contamination.225
Consequently, the plaintiff might have to prove that other companies’
operations did not cause the contamination.226
In states that permit claims based on ultra-hazardous activities and
impose strict liability, some of the evidentiary burdens for ordinary
negligence claims are lifted.227 Negligence imposes liability on actors for
harm that their failure to exercise reasonable care causes.228 Under a strictliability theory, the defendant is liable for harms that the activity in
question causes.229 The plaintiff does not bear the burden of proving that
the defendant’s actions were negligent or careless, which has proven
difficult in contamination cases.230 This burden might be replaced,
however, with burdens requiring the plaintiff to prove that the activity
itself satisfies the ultra-hazardous factors.231 The primary inquiry
established by the six-factor test232 is
whether the nature of the activity and the potential dangers
associated with it, given the particular location, are so great that
despite the usefulness it may have for the community, it should be
required as a matter of law to pay for any harm it causes without
the need of a finding of negligence.233
All factors should be considered, but no requirement that all factors be
present exists.234 Ordinarily, a finding that several factors are satisfied is
required for a finding of strict liability.235 The burden of establishing
225. Anthony, 284 F.3d at 590.
226. Id. at 587.
227. See Alan O. Sykes, Strict Liability versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1918–19 (2007).
228. Id. at 1918.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1918–19.
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1255–56 (5th Cir. 1985) (listing the factors
in Louisiana for determining whether an activity is ultra-hazardous prior to the
1996 amendment).
232. See supra Part II.A.2.
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see
also Nathan R. Hoffman, The Feasibility of Applying Strict-Liability Principles to
Carbon Capture and Storage, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 527, 541–42, n.144 (2010).
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
235. Id. at cmt. f.
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evidence that tips the balance of the factors in favor of a finding that hydraulic
fracturing is an ultra-hazardous activity has proven arduous in recent
decisions.236 For example, in Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., the plaintiffs
established that their water supply had been contaminated but were unable to
provide substantial evidence to support their claim that hydraulic fracturing
constituted an ultra-hazardous activity.237 Additionally, they could not
establish that the drilling company’s operations caused the contamination.238
B. Lack of Evidence
The overarching problem in the case law, public opinion, and
regulations is a lack of evidence and information. Plaintiffs have been able
to prove that their water supplies are contaminated on several occasions;239
however, they have not been able to provide evidence proving that
hydraulic fracturing caused the contamination.240 Furthermore, permitting
claims to be brought under an ultra-hazardous activity theory might further
equitable relief in some cases, but generally these claims will still suffer
from a lack of causation evidence.241 The lack of evidence infiltrates the
case law under the ultra-hazardous analysis in two ways. First, the plaintiff
generally lacks the evidence to establish the factual link between the
source of the hydraulic fluid and the contamination of the groundwater.242
Second, this same lack of evidence in the aggregate weighs against a
finding that hydraulic fracturing is ultra-hazardous—the factors will weigh
against a finding of the activity being ultra-hazardous if the risk of the
activity has not been sufficiently established.243 The risk of hydraulic
fracturing cannot be sufficiently established without the acquisition of data
over many years, as the EPA study evidences.244
236. See Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 518, 534 (M.D. Pa.
2014); Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
237. Ely, 38 F. Supp. at 523.
238. Id. (plaintiff offered expert witness testimony that the fluid contaminant
likely migrated from the wells into the water supply).
239. Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578, 581–82 (5th Cir. 2002);
Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 523.
240. Anthony, 284 F.3d at 586–87; Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 523.
241. See King, supra note 48, at 344.
242. See, e.g., Anthony, 284 F.3d at 590; see also King, supra note 48, at 346.
243. Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 529 (citing Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1219
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting that “whether an activity presents a high degree of
risk should not focus on whether the Defendants acted negligently, but instead
should remain focused on whether the activity itself is abnormally dangerous”).
244. See supra Part III.A.
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C. Regulation
The same lack of information has affected the implementation of
federal regulations as well. In 2011, Congress proposed the Fracturing
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (“FRAC”) Act.245 The FRAC
Act would amend the SDWA by repealing the fracking exemption, or
“Halliburton Loophole,” and requiring hydraulic fracturing operators to
disclose the chemicals used in their fracturing fluid mixture.246 In 2012,
Congress introduced another piece of legislation entitled the “Fracturing
Regulations are Effective in State Hands” (“FRESH”) Act, which
proposed that all regulatory authority over fracking should be left to the
states.247 However, neither piece of legislation was reported out-ofcommittee.248 Congress either chose to continue its disregard for
establishing some form of hydraulic fracturing legislation, or it was
awaiting guidance from an EPA study on the potential effects of hydraulic
fracturing on water resources.
The 2015 Draft Assessment of the EPA study249 cited several instances
in which fluid migration occurred and was caused by hydraulic injections,
and it concluded that the evidence shows drinking water resources might
have been impacted by hydraulic fracturing fluids escaping the wellbore
and surrounding formations in certain areas.250 The study confirmed that
water contamination occurred through spills of hydraulic fracturing fluid,
discharge of treated hydraulic fracturing wastewater, underground
migration of fluids and gas, and direct injection.251 The study found that
occurrences of drinking water impacts are minimal relative to the number
of hydraulically fractured wells.252 This result might imply that drinking
water impacts by fracking operations are rare or that the results might be
understated because of “insufficient pre- and post-hydraulic fracturing
data on the quality of drinking water resources.”253 Presumably, the EPA’s
245. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act,
H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (2011).
246. Rebecca Jo Reser & David T. Ritter, State and Federal Legislation and
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 57 ADVOCATE 31, 33 (2011).
247. Fracturing Regulations Are Effective in State Hands (FRESH) Act, S.
2248, 112th Cong. (2012).
248. CARL E. BEHRENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42756, ENERGY POLICY:
112TH CONGRESS ISSUES AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 9 (2012).
249. See supra Part III.A.
250. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-57.
251. Id. at 10-19–10-20.
252. Id. at 10-20.
253. Id.
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study will not aid Congress in a determination of how to proceed with
regulations, and Congress will continue to leave regulation up to the
states.254 The study’s findings on the effects of hydraulic fracturing remain
inconclusive because of the same lack of information impacting potential
plaintiffs.
V. A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS CONTAMINATION CONCERNS
Although the detrimental effects of hydraulic fracturing remain
unclear, the process is beneficial in a number of ways.255 With this in mind,
any proposed strategy should not act as a roadblock to the shale boom, but
rather should facilitate its continuance while incentivizing innovation,
information gathering, and operating under best practices. Baseline water
testing and chemical disclosures are both regulations that will further the
knowledge of the industry’s practices while furthering the industry itself.
Innovation and advancing technology require a substantial data set as a
prerequisite. Thus, all regulations applied to the industry should further
the acquisition of data. However, hydraulic fracturing provides a difficult
set of circumstances to determine whether ex post or ex ante schemes
would be more beneficial, given the lack of conclusive findings.
A. Ex Post Regulation
Tort liability is an ex post regulatory strategy because it imposes
monetary sanctions on parties causing injury after the injury occurred and
the cause has been determined.256 The policy benefits of imposing liability
on hydraulic fracturing operations are two-fold. First, the companies are
incentivized to reduce harm by implementing new innovations, high safety
standards, and self-regulation.257 Second, parties who suffer harm will be
compensated if they can establish the required elements.258 This form of
regulation is beneficial when the activity being regulated is not very well
understood or is very complex, thus rendering the drafting of an allencompassing set of regulations impractical. However, ex post liability does
not always grant equitable relief in hydraulic fracturing cases.259
Additionally, tort liability as a regulatory strategy might make operators’
predictions of costs in their risk analysis difficult because of the uncertainty
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.C.
Merrill & Schizer, supra note 160, at 212.
Id. at 209.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
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involved with jury decisions, which often leads to inefficiencies associated
with under- or over-deterrence.260 When one regulatory strategy cannot
fulfill its goals, a blended strategy of tort liability and best-practice
regulation might be beneficial.261
B. Ex Ante Regulation
Ex ante regulation attempts to reduce the risk of harm before its
occurrence through several methods, including establishing best-practice
standards.262 Best-practice regulations encourage industries to develop
standard practices that provide a safe, efficient, and economical method of
operation.263 When these regulations are enforced efficiently, industries
benefit by having predictable regulatory costs and standards to follow, as
opposed to unpredictable settlement costs and jury awards.264 Additionally,
applying a regulatory standard provides reassurance to the public, which
may prove beneficial to the hydraulic fracturing industry given the bitter
debate, much of which may be attributed to the lack of regulation.265
Implementing standard methods in the industry will also further the
information assimilation and understanding of hydraulic fracturing.
When industries perform similar tasks in a similar fashion, it facilitates
the gathering of data in a more expedient and reliable way. When the
number of variables is reduced and the amount of data is increased, the
study of fracking will produce more conclusive results, thus culminating
in answers to important unanswered questions. Hydraulic fracturing has
provided tremendous beneficial impacts to Louisiana with a negligible
amount of currently known harm.266 Any regulations implemented should
take this factor into account to prevent overregulation or stifling of the

260. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 160, at 209.
261. Id. at 216 (recommending a blended regulation strategy comprising both
“command and control regulation” for issues that are well understood and liability
for the other issues).
262. Id. at 221; Gerken, supra note 109, at 99.
263. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 160, at 222–23.
264. Id. at 207 (citing cf. Khalid A Rahim, Why Pollution Standards Are Preferred
by Industries: Pragmatism and Rent-Seeking Behavior, 16 ENVIRONMENTALIST 49,
52–53 (1996)).
265. See Samantha-Rae Tuthill, Understanding Fracking: Arguments for and
Against Natural Gas Extraction, ACCUWEATHER (Sept. 9, 2013, 8:31 AM),
http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/fracking-environmental-health/1744
4221 [https://perma.cc/X8B4-X45E].
266. See supra Part I.C. But see supra Part I.B.
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industry.267 The regulations should advance the industry while incentivizing
the assimilation of information and innovation.
1. Baseline Testing
Currently, Louisiana does not require fracking operators to perform
water testing before commencing operations. Incorporating a baseline
water-testing requirement into Louisiana’s regulatory strategy is imperative
to the long-term betterment of the hydraulic fracturing industry. Baseline
water testing provides a benchmark for the water composition before
commencing drilling operations.268 Once fracking has begun, or ceased, and
contamination has been alleged, the water can be retested to determine any
changes in the water’s composition. If contaminants are found in the second
sample that were not present in the first and the contaminant is an oil- and
gas-production-related chemical, an allegation of contamination would
likely be supported. The baseline water testing data would benefit the
landowner by supplementing his or her case with evidence of causation that
is typically lacking.269 By contrast, if the second water test revealed that
the contaminant was not a chemical related to the hydraulic fracturing
process or that the water had not been contaminated, the operator would
be able to use this evidence to prove that its operations did not contaminate
the water. If a presumption of liability were enforced in these cases, the
operator would have to prove that his operations did not cause the
contamination or that a third party’s operations did. In either case, the
plaintiff would likely obtain an equitable remedy, as long as the
contamination occurred within the required radius and time frame.
Members of the hydraulic fracturing production community often
claim that hydraulic fracturing has never been proven to be the cause of
groundwater contamination.270 Baseline testing gives the industry an
opportunity to prove how small the risk of contamination is while
accumulating data that may facilitate innovation. Additionally, numerous
267. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 160, at 203–04.
268. See Hall, supra note 186, at 870.
269. See King, supra note 48, at 344.
270. AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 12, at 7 (“There have been no
confirmed cases of groundwater contamination from hydraulic fracturing itself in
1 million wells fracked over the past 60 years.”); but see U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, supra note 11, at 20 (“Below ground movement of fluids, including gas,
most likely via the production well, have contaminated drinking water resources.
In some cases, hydraulic fracturing fluids have also been directly injected into
drinking water resources, as defined in this assessment, to produce oil or gas that
co-exists in those formations.”).
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studies seeking to determine the effects of hydraulic fracturing on
groundwater have found contaminants, such as methane, in drinking water
wells from natural occurrences.271 Having baseline water data gives operators
the data necessary to prove that they are not the source of contamination to
not only plaintiffs, but also to the public in general.
The cost of sampling and testing is a deterrent for requiring operators to
perform baseline testing. The states with these requirements in place have
attempted to reduce the cost burden by limiting the number of water sources
that an operator would have to sample and permitting the use of sampling
done for nearby wells, that is, if they were performed in the time frame
permitted.272 In Wyoming, the average cost of sampling is between $680 and
$1,090 per sample—testing the four wells the law requires, including the
initial sampling and analyses, would cost approximately $5,800, if isotopic
testing of the methane is not required.273 If the sampling is done both before
and after fracturing, the total cost would be an estimated $11,600.274 In
comparison, the average cost of drilling and completing a well in the popular
Haynesville Shale formation located in Louisiana is $9.95 million.275 At first
glance, baseline testing might seem expensive, but when considered as a
relative cost of drilling and completing a well in Louisiana, the cost would be
just over 0.1% of the total cost of drilling and completing a well. This cost is
entirely reasonable considering the benefits provided.
At the federal level, the Department of the Interior recently removed the
requirement that operators perform baseline water testing from its proposed

271. Hall, supra note 186, at 888 n.141 (citing ELIZABETH W. BOYER ET AL.,
CTR. FOR RURAL PA., THE IMPACT OF MARCELLUS GAS DRILLING ON RURAL
DRINKING WATER SUPPLIES 4 (2012) (finding that pre-drilling samples from
about 20% of the sites contained methane); Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane
Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and
Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8173 (2011) (finding
that a large portion of the drinking water wells tested for the study contained
methane regardless of industry operations).
272. 055-003 WYO. CODE R. § 46(e) (LexisNexis 2016).
273. Hall, supra note 186, at 875.
274. This total estimated cost of $11,600 is calculated by simply doubling
$5,800, the cost of pre-operation testing, to account for both pre- and postoperation testing. Hall does not derive the total cost, but mentions that postoperation testing may be cheaper because post-operation costs would not include
the costs associated with identifying which wells to test. See id.
275. Mark Kaiser & Yunke Yu, North Louisiana Drilling Costs Vary Slightly
2007-12, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 2014, at 1, http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume112/issue-1/exploration-development/north-louisiana-drilling-costs-vary-slightly-2
007-12.html [https://perma.cc/HCW5-H4A3].
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rules governing hydraulic fracturing on federal lands.276 The Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) agrees with the commentators—acquiring baseline
water data is a good policy, a best practice, and is beneficial to all parties.277
Although BLM encourages baseline testing, it will not require the testing on
a national level for two reasons. First, the hydrogeological conditions vary
significantly across the nation, and establishing a single comprehensive rule
to cover all such conditions would be difficult.278 Second, in many instances,
BLM does not manage the surface above the leased minerals.279 However,
BLM recommends that if water quality impacts are anticipated, baseline
testing may be implemented with requirements developed on a case-by-case
basis.280 Thus the federal government has again left the requirement of best
practices to local authorities, who are better informed of the states’ specific
conditions and variables.
Louisiana should require baseline testing as a preventative measure to
increase the likelihood of early detection and promote innovation, while
simultaneously protecting its landowners and resources. The state has
regretted taking a lackadaisical approach to hazardous material regulation in
the past281 and will find itself in a similar situation if preventative actions are
not taken.
276. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed.
Reg. 16,183 (Mar. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. LA. REV. STAT. §30:2193(A) (2016) provides,
It is the determination of the legislature that Louisiana is particularly illsuited both hydrologically and climatically to hazardous waste land disposal
methods and past land disposal methods, siting criteria, and maintenance
procedures have, despite the degree of stringency, been inadequate to insure
the health of the citizens of the state and in maintaining the integrity of the
environment generally and water resources specifically. It is further
determined that eventual releases of hazardous constituents from land
disposal facilities are highly probable if land disposal methods continue to
be relied upon and that there presently exists alternatives which may be used
to destroy, reduce, or lessen the toxicity of or lessen the leaching potential of
hazardous wastes. In order to preclude further environmental damage and
endangerment to the citizens of the state, it is the purpose of this Section to
provide for restrictions and incentives designed to encourage alternative
methods of hazardous waste disposal, destruction, and reduction; to lessen
the possibility of hazardous waste releases from existing land disposal sites;
and to provide for the eventual prohibition of land disposal of hazardous
waste.
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If baseline water testing is required and over time the data proves that
contamination is not occurring as a result of hydraulic fracturing, Louisiana
will benefit by removing the burden of enforcing the unnecessary regulation
of a safe industry. Conversely, if the data shows that groundwater
contamination is occurring, early detection will allow Louisiana to determine
the additional regulatory or statutory restrictions required to protect its
underground water supply. If Louisiana is constantly acquiring data, evidence
of a systemic problem will be known years in advance compared to the
timeline of Louisiana beginning data acquisition as problems arise.
Additionally, the data might evidence that certain formations or regions are
more susceptible to drinking water impacts by hydraulic fracturing. If that
happens, the state may apply more rigid regulations in those locations to
combat the increased risk of contamination.
2. Best Practices
Over time, as a comprehensive data set is established, best-practices
regulations should be enacted for those aspects of hydraulic fracturing
operations that become well-understood with established methods. For areas
that remain dubious or are lacking in data, Louisiana should establish required
testing, similar to baseline water testing, by in-state operators to gather the
data. If the proposed measures are in place and injury occurs, the injured
parties must seek equitable relief through liability claims. The injured parties
will be in a better position because they will have the baseline water data,
which will provide the means to prove causation. As the number of fracking
operations continues to increase, the amount of data regarding its effects will
also increase, and the industry will become standardized. This data will further
the understanding of the effects of fracking while providing operators and
injured parties the data necessary either to prove or disprove the element of
causation.282
Data accumulated over a number of years could show helpful trends in
the locations and level of any contamination. These trends can then be
evaluated to determine which methods and materials are more prone to
causing injury and in what geologic formations the injury is most likely to
occur. This information will allow the industry to adjust its operations
accordingly to avoid litigation based on methods and conditions found to be
more at risk for contamination. State regulators may also evaluate the data to
determine whether further regulation is required in certain areas or for certain
operations, or whether imposed regulations are unnecessary and should be
removed. As the information develops, certain practices will be found to be
282. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 160, at 158.
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the safest and most effective. These practices should become the bestpractices standard. The best-practice standards should provide methods an
operator can follow that are proven safe and effective and require minimum
regulation.
For an evolving and growing industry such as hydraulic fracturing
production, regulations should promote research and development of the
industry while protecting Louisiana’s finite resources. Hydraulic fracturing
has provided significant benefits with minimal known injuries; therefore,
Louisiana’s movement toward practical and efficient steps to protect the
industry is important.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana is in the midst of a manufacturing renaissance283 that is
pumping billions of dollars into its economy,284 the essence of which is
hydraulically fractured natural gas. As the growth of the industry continues,
hydraulic fracturing will be performed on an expanding scale with an
increasing number of operators. Louisiana must take steps to promote safe
hydraulic fracturing and data acquisition while the long-term effects of
hydraulic fracturing are determined. Initially, the state should impose required
baseline water testing prior to any hydraulic fracturing activity. If Louisiana
waits until widespread contamination occurs it will be too late, because the
time frame for contamination may be decades. As the industry becomes better
understood, the state may choose to increase or reduce regulations
accordingly. Ideally, the data will prove that contamination is rare. However,
until conclusive determinations can be made on the long-term effects of
widespread hydraulic fracturing use, Louisiana must require operators to
acquire the data necessary to protect landowners, natural resources, and the
industry itself.
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